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THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING—
A SIGNALING MODEL
Ronen Avraham* and Abraham Wickelgren†
INTRODUCTION
Elwin Francis settled his personal injury case for $150,000 and
walked away with $111 from the settlement.  Yes, the lawyers got their
one-third, but this is not a story about attorney malpractice.1  Mr.
Francis’s limited recovery stems from his involvement with the new
kid in town: third-party litigation funders.  Several years before the
case settled, Mr. Francis borrowed money from LawCash and
Lawbuck$, two litigation funding companies, via nonrecourse loans.
The nature of the loans meant that he only had to repay them if his
case was successful.  The catch was the extremely high interest rate—
much higher than rates charged by credit card companies.  All told,
Mr. Francis borrowed $27,000; however with the high interest rates,
the amount due had swelled to $96,000 by the time the case had set-
tled.2  Out of the $150,000 settlement, LawCash and Lawbuck$ re-
ceived a profit of $69,000 in interest that amounted to 46% of the
settlement.  The repayment of the principle of the loans represented
another 18%, the attorney fees and expenses took a little more than
one-third, and the plaintiff was left with nothing except for the money
that had been advanced to him by the funding companies.3  Although
this situation sounds like an extreme example, the loan arrangement is
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1. Indeed, a trial judge threw out Mr. Francis’s malpractice suit against his attorneys.  Joan C.
Rogers, Law Firm Wins Dismissal of Suit by Client Whose Litigation Loans Ate Up Settlement, 29
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 53, 53 (Jan. 30, 2013), available at http://www.bna
.com/law-firm-wins-n17179872101/.
2. Affirmation in Support of Cross Motion to Amend Complaint and in Opposition to De-
fendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, 6, Francis v. Mirman, Markovits, & Landau, P.C., No. 29993/10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2012).
3. Id. at 2. Specifically there were $49,263 in legal fees, $96,408 (which was reduced to
$94,000) due to LawBuck$, $4,415 to LawCash, $2,211 in expenses, and $111 due to the plaintiff.
Id.
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not unique, and is part of a larger trend of third-party litigation fund-
ing that has been sweeping across America in recent years.4
Should third-party litigation funding be allowed?  Proponents of
third-party funding mention the increased access to justice for plain-
tiffs—which allows them to avoid settling prematurely due to their
need for cash—as one of the important benefits of allowing these
funding arrangements.  Funding also equalizes the bargaining power
between defendants who are frequently involved in lawsuits and plain-
tiffs who lack the means to pay litigation costs.5  Litigation funding is
also desirable because it allows plaintiffs to hedge risks that they are
otherwise ill-suited to bear.  Scholars have argued that third-party fi-
nancing can help alleviate agency problems in the attorney–client re-
lationship by aligning the incentives of each party.6  Increased third-
party funding may even lead to a reduction in the amount of litigation
due to more accurate evaluations of the strength of claims.7  Still,
others have advocated for abandoning the doctrines that prohibit as-
signment or maintenance of legal claims by third parties as lacking any
basis in corrective justice or public policy.8
4. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED
STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 9 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf; see also Binyamin Appelbaum,
Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1 (discussing sev-
eral specific examples and the general trends in the lawsuit lending market).  In 2006, one plain-
tiff saw his loan grow by a factor of almost thirty.  Joseph Gill was falsely arrested by the police
and left with a serious back injury.  William J. Gorta, Bitten By Lawsuit ‘Sharks,’ N.Y. POST,
Dec. 12, 2011, at 19.  While his lawsuit against the police department was pending he needed
money and so he borrowed $4,000 via two loans from Lawbuck$, a Brooklyn-based litigation
financing firm that advances money to plaintiffs and only requires repayment if the plaintiff wins
his case or receives a settlement. Id. Fortunately for Mr. Gill, the city settled the case for
$500,000 after a jury found in his favor, but after his victory LawBuck$ demanded repayment of
the money it had loaned him.  After compounding monthly for five years at interest rates as high
as 70%, the debt had swelled to $116,000. Id.  Mr. Gill was subsequently caught up in a second
lawsuit with LawBuck$, unable to put the incident behind him.
5. See Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 145–46 (2008) (discussing how
capital-scarce situations can lower the value of a case from the plaintiff’s perspective).
6. See Max Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party Financing Change the Face
of American Tort Litigation? The Role of Agency Costs in the Attorney-Client Relationship
(Sept. 25, 2009) (unpublished paper presented at the Third Party Financing of Litigation Round-
table, Searle Ctr., Northwestern Univ. Law Sch., Sept. 2009) (on file with the Pritzker Legal
Research Center Northwestern University Law School).
7. Id.
8. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 67 (2011).  On the
defendants’ side, papers have even gone so far as to propose a risk-transfer system that would
allow for defendants in lawsuits to share their litigation risk with an investment company by
paying the investor the expected value of the lawsuit plus a premium. See Jonathan T. Molot, A
Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 375 (2009).
2014] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 235
Opponents of third-party litigation funding are concerned that be-
cause the funder’s sole interest in the lawsuit is financial, the funder
will be concerned only with maximizing its return on its investment
and will not be concerned with the plaintiff’s rights.9  Funders desiring
to protect their investment could undercut a plaintiff’s control over
the suit.  Also, because the funder does not have a fiduciary relation-
ship or privilege with the plaintiff, its involvement in the suit will
eventually cause an unwanted relaxation of rules governing attorney-
client privilege and attorney professional responsibility.  Opponents
reason that litigation will be unnecessarily prolonged because third-
party funders introduce a disincentive for plaintiffs to settle below the
funders’ suggested amount.10  Lastly, some scholars have proposed
that allowing third-party litigation funding will lead to an increase in
litigation that will be harmful to the civil litigation system.11
This Article observes that consumer legal funding serves a welfare-
enhancing function in society because it: (1) allows plaintiffs to dis-
charge parts of the risk of litigation to parties that are better suited to
bear it; (2) allows plaintiffs with liquidity constraints to receive the
funds they need; and (3) breaks the monopsony power that defend-
ants have vis-a`-vis plaintiffs’ ability to sell their claim (i.e., to settle).
The monopsony breakup benefits plaintiffs who can now sell part of
their claim to a third party, which consequently buys them more time
to get a better settlement with the defendant.  The monopsony
breakup also causes future defendants to more accurately internalize
the costs of their conduct and therefore to take due care, as they know
they will not be able to discharge their liability easily by settling
cheaply.
We argue that these benefits could be enhanced significantly if
third-party funding contracts were allowed to be admissible as evi-
dence in courts.  This will provide courts with a credible signal from
the private market regarding the merits of the case because if the
plaintiff loses the case, the funder gets nothing.  Thus, funders will
have incentives to invest in cases with the highest yield, and courts—
and defendants—will infer that these cases have more merit.  Not only
will admitting these contracts in courts improve the accuracy of adju-
dication, it will also cause funders to charge lower interest rates in an
effort to demonstrate to courts the strength of the plaintiff’s claim.
9. See JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS,
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2009).
10. Id. at 4.
11. Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 675 (2011).
236 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:233
In a companion paper we develop a signaling model that analyzes
the effect of admitting the consumer financing agreement to the court
and making it part of the record of the case.12  Below we explain how
this model works informally. While the current system obviously is not
perfect and can lead to situations in which a plaintiff is charged ex-
tremely high interest rates, the results from our signaling model are
promising and lead us to two important conclusions about the benefits
of consumer legal funding.  First, our model demonstrates that the
overall quality of litigation will improve if the loan agreements be-
tween plaintiffs and lenders are introduced to the court.  Second, as a
result of the introduction of the agreement to the court, the interest
rates charged by third-party lenders will decrease.  The reason for this
is that the court will infer that the lower the interest rate the funder
charges, the stronger the funder thinks the case is.  Thus, charging
lower interest rates increases the probability that the plaintiff, and
therefore the funder, recovers.  We therefore conclude that third-
party funding need not be prohibited but rather encouraged and fully
disclosed to courts.
After discussing the signaling model, we address how these agree-
ments could be disclosed to the court.  We demonstrate that there is
no bulletproof way to accomplish this, and we discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of the various ways of doing so.  Part II of this Arti-
cle lays out the structure of the consumer legal funding system in the
United States.  Beginning with an overview of the market, it then
turns to the factors that funders use in making their decisions to loan
money to plaintiffs.  Part II.B gives the lay of the land by examining
state variations in the legal treatment of third-party funding arrange-
ments.  Part II.C provides a similar overview, but this time by review-
ing the previous scholarship on the topic of third-party litigation
funding, situating this Article within the literature.  Part III then
presents our signaling model, which proposes using the funding con-
tract to reduce loan interest rates and improve the accuracy of the
court’s decision on the merits.  This can be achieved by admitting the
funding contract to the court.  In Part IV we look more closely at the
model and address some of the potential concerns about its
implementations.
12. Ronen Avraham & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Admissible Third Party Litigation Funding
Contracts as a Way to Constrain the Exploitation of Plaintiffs (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 242, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1986951.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Market Structure of Consumer Legal Funding
in the United States
This subpart focuses briefly on the U.S. market structure for con-
sumer legal funding and the factors companies consider when making
funding decisions.  According to the RAND study on third-party
funding, as of 2010 there were twenty-nine companies making loans to
consumers.13  Many of these companies are members of a trade group
called the American Legal Finance Association (ALFA).14  There are
two ways that a lender can obtain a stake in pending litigation.15  The
first category of third-party litigation funding is consumer legal fund-
ing.  This involves loans or advances made to individual plaintiffs—
usually in personal injury or employment discrimination claims—
while their case is pending, such as the loans made to Mr. Francis by
Lawbuck$ and LawCash.  These loans are debt based because they
involve a set amount of money to be paid back with interest if the
litigation is successful.  While a claim is pending, plaintiffs often lack
financial resources, as the injuries that triggered the lawsuit may have
rendered them unable to work and earn money.  As a result, they can
find themselves under tremendous pressure to settle with the defen-
dant to get money as soon as possible.  Other options, such as borrow-
ing money from more traditional lenders or getting money advanced
from their attorneys, are generally unavailable.16  The money is ad-
vanced as a nonrecourse loan: the firms charge a high fixed interest
13. GARBER, supra note 4, at 10, 11 tbl.1.
14. Id.
15. There is a third type of funding that is present in the United States and discussed in the
RAND paper.  This is when financing firms make loans directly to plaintiffs’ law firms. See id. at
13.  These are generally recourse loans that are collateralized via the firm’s assets, including
revenue from future case fees.  Because they are recourse loans, they must be paid back and are
subject to usury laws, which will be discussed later in the introduction.  According to the RAND
paper there is not a lot of information available about these lending practices, but it is likely that
law firms who obtain these loans are doing so because they need money to finance their cases
but they cannot get loans from more traditional lenders. Id.  The firms that receive these loans
are probably contingency fee firms that must invest their own resources into cases and only
recover if their client wins.  This means that there might not be steady paychecks coming in from
hourly billings.  This category of loans is not relevant to this Article because the loans are re-
course loans and must be repaid, which makes them very different from the nonrecourse loans in
consumer and commercial claim funding.
16. Lauren J. Grous, Note, Causes of Action for Sale: The New Trend of Legal Gambling, 61
U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 206 (2006).  There are specific rules that prevent attorneys from advanc-
ing money to their clients. Id. at 205–06; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)
(2013) (stating that a “lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with
pending or contemplated litigation”).
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rate on the loan, usually between 2%–5% monthly, to be paid only
upon the plaintiff’s recovery.17
Because these loans are usually small, the amount of diligence re-
quired to make sure each personal injury lawsuit is worth more than a
fixed amount is too high to justify a structure where the funder takes
on a large amount of risk.18  Therefore, the loans generally top out at
$20,000 or 10% of the expected recovery, which reduces the risk to
the funder.19  However, since there is still a chance the company will
receive nothing if the plaintiff loses, litigation financing companies
evaluate each request for funding based on information they receive
about the claim and thereby make a determination about the strength
of the claim.20  With extremely high interest rates, one might believe
that the risk of nonrecovery from these litigation loans is high.  But
that is generally not the case.21  Instead, these high interest rates turn
into profits for the lender.
The RAND study reported that the majority of the lawsuits that
receive funding from one of these companies involve automobile acci-
dents.22  Further, the average size of the loan made by these compa-
nies is $1,750–$4,500, with a maximum advance of $20,000.23  As a
17. It is structured as a loan with the interest rate not dependent on the recovery to avoid
champerty and maintenance restrictions, and on a nonrecourse basis to avoid usury restriction
laws.  Both champerty and maintenance involve third-party interference in a lawsuit that assists
the plaintiff in bringing his or her claim. See Sebok, supra note 8, at 72–73.  Champerty is a
subset of maintenance, with the chief difference being that maintenance does not include a fi-
nancial reward to the intermeddler, while champerty includes a financial stake for the third
party. Id.  Maintenance is defined as “assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a
litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in the case [or] meddling in someone else’s
litigation.” Id. at 72 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed.
2009)).  Champerty, a more specific variant on maintenance, is “[a]n agreement between an
officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the
litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.” Id. at 73 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262).
18. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99
GEO. L.J. 65, 95 (2010).
19. GARBER, supra note 4, at 12; see also Grous, supra note 16, at 207.
20. Grous, supra note 16, at 208–09.  The information that must be transmitted to the lending
company often comes from the plaintiff’s attorney, which can lead to potential issues relating to
the waiver of attorney-client privilege regarding anything shared with the third party. See
BEISNER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 8.
21. See Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and
Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 726–27 (2007) (discussing how litigation fi-
nancing companies only accept cases with a high chance of success).  One company which re-
ceived $250 million in loan applications over a two-year period was so selective that it only
accepted 10% of the applications. Id. at 727.
22. GARBER, supra note 4, at 10.  One reason for this might be that drivers in all states are
required to carry insurance, and thus there is a defendant available to pay if the claim is
successful.
23. Id. at 12.
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result, consumer legal funders have been successful in their business;
the companies advertise on the Internet, television, and in publica-
tions read by plaintiffs’ attorneys.24
The second type of loan involves investing in a commercial claim
where the funder pays the costs of the litigation in return for a share
of the proceeds from the lawsuit.25  This can be thought of as equity-
based financing because the plaintiff is essentially selling a portion of
his or her recovery to the funder.  These arrangements can be benefi-
cial to plaintiffs, such as small companies with limited resources, be-
cause third-party funding levels the playing field between the plaintiff
and a powerful defendant.26  The claims in this category must be of a
high potential value so that the investment is worthwhile.  These types
of lawsuits are typically antitrust, intellectual property, and contract
disputes.27
In a typical funding arrangement with a commercial party, a special-
ized funding company or a hedge fund will pay the plaintiff’s legal fees
(sometimes several million dollars) on an interim basis and later col-
lect an interest rate of 25% or greater.28  The funder’s share can be
calculated from several factors, including: the amount of money ad-
vanced, whether there are floors or ceilings, the length of time until
recovery, the potential value of the case, and whether the case settles
or goes to trial.29  Commercial claims are funded in this riskier way
because commercial claims are often larger than personal injury
claims and therefore are worth the diligence required to reduce the
funder’s risk.  One example of such an investment company is Juridica
Investments Ltd., which has spent $121.3 million to fund twenty-three
cases.30
1. Factors Considered in Funding Decisions
Funders of consumer legal loans claim to take into account a variety
of factors when deciding whether to loan money to a plaintiff.  One
such company, Oasis Legal Finance, lists seven factors on its website:
[1.] Damages. In personal injury cases, these are generally severe
injuries that require time off work and other obligations.  Soft tissue
injuries (sprains, and other muscle injuries) will be considered on a
case by case basis.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 13; see also Molot, supra note 18, at 96.
26. See Rhee, supra note 5, at 145–46.
27. See GARBER, supra note 4, at 13.
28. Molot, supra note 18, at 98.
29. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
30. GARBER, supra note 4, at 13 n.22.
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[2.] Liability.  It must be clear that the defendant has strong liability
for causing the damage.  Liability is a key factor in our decision to
offer a lawsuit funding.
[3.] Ability to Pay.  The defendant must have the ability to pay dam-
ages through insurance or other means.  If the defendant can’t pay a
settlement, we can’t offer lawsuit funding.
[4.] Contingent Attorney Fee.  Your attorney must be compensated
from the proceeds of the case rather than a retainer or hourly fee.
He or she must be willing to assume the risk of winning the case to
be paid for services, just as Oasis is to be repaid for the lawsuit
funding.
[5.] Sufficient Margin for Investment.  When deciding whether to
extend lawsuit funding in your case, we consider what other ex-
penses will be paid from the proceeds of the settlement.  These may
include medical bills and liens.  We may check public records to find
liens on cases we are considering for legal funding.  We need to as-
sure ourselves there will be sufficient funds available for all parties.
[6.] Background.  We check records to make sure any past legal pro-
ceedings of the applicant are discharged or explainable and will not
affect the outcome of the current lawsuit before we authorize law-
suit funding.
[7.] State of Residence.  Oasis is able to extend lawsuit funding in
most states.  Those state [sic] in which we do not extend legal fund-
ing at this time are; Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland or
North Carolina.31
The second factor (liability) is the most obvious one that needs to
be evaluated.  It is arguably the only factor that requires a judgment
call on the part of the funder, because the other factors are either
present or they are not.  For example, factors four (requiring that the
attorney be on a contingent fee) and seven (disallowing loans in some
states) are mere boxes that need to be checked.  Other factors, like
five (liens and medical bills) and six (previous litigation by the plain-
tiff), may not be relevant to many of the cases.  As to the type of
injury (factor one), some, like soft tissue injuries, are evaluated on a
case-by-case basis, but many, such as quadriplegia, are likely approved
because they fall within a certain category.  Finally, factor three (abil-
ity to pay) will likely be met if the defendant has insurance.  The lia-
bility determination, however, is something that will never be
uncontested, or else the lawsuit would probably have already settled.
31. The Approval Factors for Funding Personal Injury Lawsuits, OASIS LEGAL FIN., http://
www.oasislegal.com/legal_finance_services/lawsuit_funding_approval_factors (last visited Aug.
24, 2013).
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As a result, this factor should play a large part in the funder’s determi-
nation of the interest rate and amount to be loaned.32
Other academics have come to similar conclusions about the factors
that funders consider.  For example, Nicholas Beydler asserted that
funders
vet the claim, looking at whether the plaintiff bears some responsi-
bility for the injury that is the subject of the litigation, the physical
evidence of damage and “bright blood” injuries, the sum of the
plaintiff’s medical and other bills associated with the injury, the re-
sult and jury verdict amounts in cases involving similar injuries, and
even the skill of the attorney handling the case.33
These factors follow the information on the Oasis Legal Finance
website.
While information on consumer legal funding is not widely availa-
ble, it has been argued in the commercial claim context that rates vary
greatly depending on the strength of the claim, the amount to be in-
vested, the duration of the investment, and any risk in collecting the
money.34  The funding agreements are often individually negotiated
between the plaintiff and the lender and will vary greatly based upon
the facts of a case.35  As one would expect, funding for a weaker claim
(and hence a riskier investment) will come with a higher interest rate
or larger contingency percentage.  Essentially, the funder is being
asked to assume some of the plaintiff’s risk, and the more risk the
funder is subjected to—either via a higher loan amount or a higher
chance of loss—the higher the interest rate must be to compensate.
This is similar to what we expect to see for third-party funding in the
consumer legal funding context.
B. Legal Background
The litigation funding industry is a new and growing business in the
United States.36  As litigation financing has grown, a secondary mar-
32. Although the evaluation process likely varies by funder, in one of our interviews we were
told that the lender looks at who the lawyers are and reviews some of the documents concerning
the merits of the case before making the funding decision. Cf. id.
33. Nicholas Beydler, Comment, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Con-
sumer Litigation Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2012).
34. Aaron Katz & Steven Schoenfeld, Third-party Litigation Financing: Commercial Claims as
an Asset Class, PRAC. L.J., Mar. 2012, at 36, 45, available at http://www.parabellumcap.com/docs/
March2012_ThirdPartyLitigation.pdf.
35. Id.
36. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 3.  Factors contributing to its emergence are the
growth of the industry in foreign countries, the rising costs of litigation, the lack of capital in the
traditional lending market to fund litigation, and the relaxation of rules that traditionally limited
litigation financing. Id.
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ket in legal claims has also been created where funders go public and
sell shares of legal-claims-backed securities to the public.37  There are
also at least two publically traded companies that invest in legal
claims.38
Some foreign common law systems have already shown acceptance
of third-party litigation funding, although to varying degrees.  Austra-
lia, for example, has a well-developed system of litigation financiers.39
In 1990, the Australian High Court decided the landmark case
Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd., in which third-
party funding was permitted even when the funder had broad powers
to control the litigation.40  In contrast, in 2005 the English Court of
Appeals held that third-party funding was acceptable only so long as
the claimant remained in control of the litigation.41  While the third-
party funding industry in Great Britain is not as advanced as in Aus-
tralia, it is reportedly developing quickly.42  Courts in South Africa43
and New Zealand44 have also accepted the practice.  The U.S legal
system, however, is different from the systems in those countries in
two important respects.  First, in the United States most of the law-
suits subject to third-party funding are paid on a contingency fee basis
and not on hourly rates.  Second, in the United States the winner of
the case bears its own legal costs, whereas in other countries they are
borne by the losing party.
American courts have approached third-party litigation financing
with mixed attitudes.  Some courts enforce obstacles against this type
of financing, typically using doctrines prohibiting champerty and
usury.  Champerty is a form of maintaining, supporting, or promoting
another party’s litigation when the money provided for litigation is
later exchanged for a portion of the proceeds.45  Usury, an unrelated
37. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1268, 1282 (2011).
38. See GARBER, supra note 4, at 16 (reviewing publically available information about litiga-
tion financing companies that invest in commercial claims).
39. See, e.g., Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.);
Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the
United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 107 (2008).
40. Fostif, 229 CLR 386; see also Steinitz, supra note 37, at 1288–89.
41. Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655, [40] (Eng); see also Steinitz, supra
note 37, at 1281.
42. Martin, supra note 39, at 112–13.
43. See Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc. v. Nat’l Potato Coop. Ltd. 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA).
44. See Re Nautilus Devs. Ltd. (In Liquidation) [2000] 2 NZLR 505 (HC).
45. See 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 15:1 (4th ed. 2010).
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doctrine, is when a lender takes more compensation (usually in the
form of interest) than is legal in exchange for a loan.46
Not every jurisdiction has adopted champerty restrictions.  For ex-
ample, New Jersey has never adopted any limitations.47  Connecticut
has not adopted any either, though courts there test whether a litiga-
tion finance agreement is against public policy.48  Kansas has only
adopted restrictions in cases wherein parties frequently initiate litiga-
tion.49  Indeed, more states have taken steps towards rejecting these
types of restrictions.  In 1997, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court abolished them in Saladini v. Righellis, reasoning that while the
purpose of champerty laws is to combat excessive litigation, other doc-
trines—such as public policy against unreasonable contingency fees or
the prohibitions against frivolous lawsuits—can do a better job.50  The
court explained that it will look to factors such as the respective bar-
gaining power and awareness of the parties, the borrower’s ability to
pursue the lawsuit without the funds, and whether the total amount
paid to the funder (if she is successful) would be unreasonable.51
The Supreme Court of South Carolina similarly decided to abolish
champerty restrictions and use other doctrines to battle the evils that
champerty was designed to target.52  The court used similar factors
and added, noticeably, whether the funder is an “officious intermed-
dler.”53  Although both Massachusetts and South Carolina abandoned
restrictions, courts in these states still look to see if the funder exer-
cises too much control over the litigation.  Texas takes this approach
as well; Texas courts will examine whether funding agreements are
predatory, the extent of control exercised by the funder, and the ex-
tent to which similar agreements would burden the judicial system.54
Florida has reached a similar end by limiting champerty laws to
funders that act as officious intermeddlers.55  The Ohio legislature
passed a law in 2008 allowing and regulating litigation financing agree-
ments, requiring financing contracts to explicitly state that the funder
46. 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 81 (2007).
47. See Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195, 197–98 (1878).
48. See Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 750 A.2d 460, 463 (Conn. 2000) (citing Rice v.
Farrell, 28 A.2d 7, 8 (Conn. 1942)).
49. See Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956).
50. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1225–27 (Mass. 1997).  Other doctrines include
utilizing public policy against unreasonable fees, sanctions for misconduct, the standards of fair
dealing, and the doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and good faith. Id. at 1227.
51. Id.
52. See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000).
53. Id. at 278.
54. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App. 2006).
55. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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can exercise no control over the litigation or settlement discussions.56
Maine takes a similar approach.57
Despite the trend towards abandoning champerty laws, some states
have strongly stood by them.  Notably in Johnson v. Wright, the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals asserted its support of champerty laws,
though it discussed only one other modern case from outside its juris-
diction which voided a third-party litigation agreement as champer-
tous.58  In sum, as far as champerty is concerned, the trend is to
abolish restrictions on, or at least avoid applying them to, third-party
litigation financing arrangements where there is no good public policy
argument against the agreement and the funder does not take advan-
tage of the borrower (for instance, by controlling the litigation or hav-
ing the ability to force an early settlement).  That said, most
jurisdictions have not yet addressed the issue, and many of those tra-
ditionally enforce doctrines against champerty.
The usury doctrine has also been used to a limited extent to chal-
lenge third-party financing arrangements.  It prohibits charging exces-
sive interest in exchange for a loan of money or property.59  A
common element of usury is an absolute obligation to repay.60  Third-
party financing, such as the consumer legal funding discussed in our
signaling model, generally is in the form of nonrecourse loans and
therefore does not require repayment to the funding company if the
party recovers nothing.  Accordingly, prohibitions against usury are
generally avoided.61
Indeed, many courts classify financing agreements as something
other than loans because of their contingent nature; this, therefore,
removes them from the realm of usury.62  One New York trial court
found a third-party funding agreement to be usurious because repay-
ment was obligatory, but then adjusted the interest rate to make it
56. Act of May 28, 2008, § 1(B)(3), 2008 Ohio Laws 86 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1349.55(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2008)).
57. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 3–4.
58. Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 679–80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Rancman v.
Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003)).  In Rancman, the Supreme
Court of Ohio voided an agreement as champertous and explicitly supported ongoing enforce-
ment of the doctrine. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221.
59. 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 81 (2007).
60. See, e.g., Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1537 (2003).
61. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
62. See, e.g., Dopp v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 823 (D.N.J. 1996); In re Transcapital Fin. Corp.,
433 B.R. 900, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 260 Ill. App. 333, 358–61 (1931); Lawsuit Fin., L.L.C. v. Curry,
683 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Vinch v. Lawsuit Fin., Inc., No. 2004-3963-CK, 2005
WL 5872300, at *2, *5 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Aug. 26, 2005); Nyquist v. Nyquist, 841 P.2d 515, 518
(Mont. 1992); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 101 (Tex. App. 2006).
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legal instead of voiding the agreement altogether.63  North Carolina
has broad usury laws that cover loans with unconditional obligations
to repay the principal as well as advances.  In Odell v. Legal Bucks,
LLC, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found an agreement to be
invalid because, although it was contingent, it was an advance.64
Recently, some state legislatures have begun to address the issue.
Legislatures in Maine,65 Nebraska,66 and Ohio67 have passed laws to
govern the third-party funding industry.  The new laws often require
licensing and annual reports, which can shed light on industry prac-
tices.  In fact, the primary goal of these laws is more about increasing
transparency than reducing consumer interest rates.68  The statutes re-
quire notice and disclosure to consumers, and also require that the
plaintiff’s attorney be involved in the lending process.69  But none of
the statutes limit the interest rate that a lender may charge.70  Pro-
posed legislation in other states would go much further in restricting
the fees charged by lenders, but so far none of these proposals have
been enacted.71
C. Scholarly Treatment of Third-Party Funding
Scholars have also been split about the virtues of the litigation fi-
nance industry.  Susan Lorde Martin favors a regulation regime that
would allow litigation financing so long as licensing regimes be estab-
lished to ensure accountability and transparency of financing agree-
ments.72  Douglas R. Richmond favors litigation financing because it
can provide assistance without posing serious ethical issues.73  He con-
tends that to minimize risk of violations of norms of professional re-
sponsibility, attorneys should insist that funding companies will not
interfere with the litigation and that the funding company will take all
reasonable steps to protect confidential information.74  Maya Steinitz
writes that while laws traditionally curbing third-party funding in the
63. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, 7 Misc. 3d 1019(A), 801 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
64. Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 776–78 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
65. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 to -107 (2007).
66. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-3301 to -3309 (2010).
67. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (LexisNexis 2008).
68. Beydler, supra note 33, at 1179.
69. Id. at 1179–80.
70. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-106 to-107; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-3307 to -3309; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55; see also Beydler, supra note 33, at 1180.
71. See Beydler, supra note 33, at 1181.
72. See Martin, supra note 39.
73. Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MER-
CER L. REV. 649, 681 (2005).
74. Id. at 681–82.
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United States were meant to maintain integrity in the practice of law,
they actually achieved the opposite by excluding society’s “have-nots”
from full use of the court system.75  She maintains that while the prac-
tice does raise concerns, an overall prohibition on the industry is
unnecessary.76
Jonathan Molot also advocates for third-party litigation funding to
increase settlements on the merits.77  He writes that weaker parties,
who are less able to bear the cost of litigation and are more risk-
averse, often settle lower than they otherwise would in order to avoid
worst-case loss.78  Creating a more robust market in litigation funding
would help solve the problem of inaccurate settlements by making set-
tlements more like market transactions.79
Julia McLaughlin is more suspect of the industry.  While she ac-
knowledges its value in providing litigants with financial assistance,
she believes there are more appropriate ways of achieving this goal.80
For example, she recommends creating pools of public funds to sup-
port needy plaintiffs.81  She therefore believes financing agreements
should still be prohibited, or at least regulated.82
Jeremy Kidd proposes that an additional danger of third-party fund-
ing results from the evolving nature of the American common law
system.83  Kidd argues that litigation financiers are incentivized to in-
vest in cases that will cause courts to create new areas of tort claims.84
75. See Steinitz, supra note 37, at 1299–1300.
76. Id. at 1272.  Steinitz advocates a five-pronged reform: (1) Eliminate the champerty prohi-
bition; (2) reform the attorney-client-funder relationship and extend protection to the funder-
client relationship; (3) apply consumer protections and contract design principles to funding
agreements; (4) require court supervision over attorney-client-funder arrangements and; (5) tai-
lor securities regulation to legal-claims-backed securities. Id. at 1325–34.
Steinitz also addresses some of the concerns illuminating the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
opposition to litigation financing.  First, she notes that it is unlikely that more nonmeritorious
cases will be filed because funders must make a rational economic decision to invest in a claim
and would not do so if the claim was unlikely to succeed. Id. at 1327.  Next, by creating a
fiduciary relationship on the part of the funder to the client, the funder must consider what is
best for the plaintiff and disclose any conflicts of interest. See id. at 1328–29.  Overall, she notes
that a prohibition on litigation funding is a serious imposition on the freedom to contract, and
that careful regulation can insure that the industry does not run contrary to public policy. Id. at
1331–32.
77. Molot, supra note 18, at 101.
78. Id. at 84.
79. Id. at 73.
80. See Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT.
L. REV. 615, 627 (2007).
81. Id. at 661.
82. Id. at 656–57.
83. See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the
Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613 (2012).
84. Id. at 630–31.
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Once the precedent for new tort law is established, these financiers
will then be available for future funding, meaning that more loans can
be made.  These pressures on the court system will be driven by mone-
tary incentives—not the interests of justice.85  According to this view,
the monetary incentives of the parties will be distorted by the pres-
ence of the third-party funder.86  This may be a valid concern about
third-party funding generally, but it is not clear that this is an issue in
the consumer legal funding market.
While scholarship about litigation financing is sparse, some sugges-
tions have been made as to how courts and legislatures should address
the industry.  However, there is no significant work on the effect that
admitting third-party funding contracts in courts would have on the
litigation world.
III. THE SOLUTION
Courts and legislatures have been unable to protect consumers from
the high interest rates charged by third-party financiers.  Where state
legislatures have acted—as in Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio—the laws
have not included fee caps.  The main alleged benefit of these laws is
that they create transparency, but it is unlikely that they will reduce
the interest rates and fees paid by plaintiffs.  It is also not clear that
legislatures will be able to find the correct balance between access to
funding and high interest rates.  Where state courts have acted, they
have been “successful” in eliminating high rates by banning third-
party financing arrangements using the common law principles of
champerty and usury.  But this is not necessarily the best solution for
the plaintiff either.  There is a reason that plaintiffs are seeking third-
party financing: they need the money.  That need does not go away
when these loans are banned.
Thus, we propose the opposite: Not only should states not ban these
loans, they should make the terms of the loans available to courts.
This Article proposes that third-party financing contracts be admitted
to the court as evidence of the strength of the plaintiff’s claim as em-
bedded in the interest rate on the loan.  We show that, in most cases,
admitting the contract in courts will decrease the interest rate the
funders require.
85. Id. at 631–32.
86. Id. at 632.
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A. The Benefits
Admitting the financing contract into evidence would be beneficial
in two ways.  First, as shown in our signaling model, it will lower inter-
est rates.  This has a direct benefit to society: facilitating more trans-
fers from highly liquid (or risk-neutral) funders to less liquid (or risk-
averse) plaintiffs.  It obviously has a benefit to the plaintiff, who will
retain a larger share of any recovery.  Second, the contract will im-
prove the court’s ability to evaluate a plaintiff’s case and come to the
correct decision regarding liability and damages.  This is because the
third-party financier has conducted its own evaluation of the claim,
and the decision to fund the litigation credibly shows the plaintiff has
a strong case.  Of course, the signal the contract sends to the court
varies based upon the interest rate charged by the lender.  The court
sees this interest rate when the plaintiff introduces the contract into
evidence.  A high interest rate is associated with a riskier investment,
likely resulting from a weaker case.  A low interest rate, for a safer
investment, is evidence of a stronger claim.
B. A Sketch of the Signaling Model
We begin with the conventional premise that a plaintiff must prove
its case by a preponderance of the evidence.  This is the standard used
in almost all civil trials and it requires that the court be at least 51%
confident that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.  Without using num-
bers, this is referred to as being “more likely than not.”  If it is a tie—
meaning the court is only 50% confident—then the plaintiff has not
met his or her burden, and the defendant will prevail.  In our model, a
plaintiff’s case is either strong (legally entitled to recover) or weak
(not legally entitled to recover).  Before any investigation, we assume
that all parties share a common belief that any given plaintiff’s case
has a given probability, which we call p, of being strong.  That is, we
simply assume that there is some level of general information that the
judge begins with, and that he or she will then update this probability
with new signals that are received during the litigation of a specific
case.  The judge will do this by using Bayes’s rule—a mathematical
equation that provides a way to update one’s baseline probability with
new signals.87  The updated information is called the “posterior
probability.”88
87. For a discussion of how Bayes’s rule can be applied to the introduction of evidence into
court, see generally Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
88. A good example can be found at Bayes Theorem (aka, Bayes Rule), STAT TREK, http://stat
trek.com/probability/bayes-theorem.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).  In the example, we learn
that on average a certain wedding venue has rain only 5 days of the year, or 1.4% of the time (5/
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For simplicity, we represent all of the information that the court
receives during the course of the litigation as a single signal  of the
strength of the plaintiff’s case.  This signal is based on the presenta-
tions at trial (the evidence, the testimonies, etc.) and is, in effect, a
reduction of all these presentations into a number between zero and
one.  Higher values of this signal are more likely if the plaintiff’s case
is actually strong, while lower values are more likely if the plaintiff’s
case is actually weak.  Thus, if the court only had access to its own
signal, it would rule for the plaintiff if the value of its signal exceeded
some cutoff level.  The exact value of the cutoff will depend on p, the
overall probability that any plaintiff has a strong case.  The higher p is,
the lower will be the signal required to ensure that the final
probability that the plaintiff has a strong case exceeds 50% (this fol-
lows simply from Bayes’s rule).
So far, we have simply reduced the court’s conventional practice
into a mathematical representation without adding anything new to
what might already happen in a hypothetical court.  With this mathe-
matical representation of a court’s decision-making process in mind,
we advocate for the addition of a second signal into the equation by
allowing the court to update its analysis by incorporating the funder’s
signal (i.e., the funder’s  assessment of the strength of the case).
To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we assume that the
funder’s investigation of the plaintiff’s case provides it with a binary
signal of the strength of the case.  That is, the funder can get either a
low or a high signal.  The probability that the funder’s signal is correct
is q > 1/2.  That is, if the plaintiff’s case is, in fact, strong (weak), the
funder will obtain a high (low) signal with probability q.  The novel,
and important, part of our model is that we show that the funding
contract can reveal this signal to the court.  Ultimately, the court can
use this signal to make a more informed decision on the merits.
The way the funding contract (credibly) reveals the funder’s signal
is through the interest rate that the plaintiff received from the funder.
For example, the funder will only offer a contract with a relatively low
interest rate if the funder believes there is a high probability the plain-
tiff will prevail (because the funder received a high signal).  In con-
365).  However, a weatherman who is accurate 90% of the time has forecasted rain for the day of
the wedding.  From reading this example one might be very concerned that it would rain on the
day of the wedding if one puts lots of weight on the weatherman.  On the other hand, one might
be too confident if one puts lots of weight on the baseline probability and little weight on the
weatherman.  Bayes’s rule provides a way to combine the pieces of information taking into ac-
count the known accuracy of the weatherman.  In the weatherman example, we would only pre-
dict an 11% chance that it will rain on that day.  This perhaps counterintuitive result occurs
because of the very low baseline probability of rain.
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trast, if the funder believes the plaintiff has a somewhat lower
probability of prevailing (because it received a low signal), then the
funder will require the plaintiff to pay a higher interest rate to receive
funding since the funder is less likely to be paid back.  In sum, the
interest rate will reveal the funder’s true signal because the funder’s
profit-maximizing interest rate will vary based on the signal it
receives.89
The relationship between risk and interest rates is one that should
be accessible to a judge and even a jury.  Anyone who has taken out a
loan to purchase a car or a home should know that one’s interest rate
for borrowing money varies based upon the riskiness of the loan.  One
can easily compare a home mortgage, in which the house is listed as
collateral and makes the loan less risky, with a credit card, which in-
volves no collateral, and see that the interest rate for the credit card
must be higher to compensate for the increased risk that the loan will
not be repaid.  In other words, the task that our signaling model asks
of the judge reflects a very intuitive concept.
Under the assumptions of our signaling model, if, based on the
presentations made at trial, the plaintiff’s case is weak, that is the
court receives a very low signal from the plaintiff’s case, then no sig-
nal—not even a high one—from the funder will cause the court to
change its mind and find for the plaintiff (unless the baseline
probability, p, that the plaintiff’s case is strong is quite high).  In con-
trast, if the court receives a high signal from the plaintiff’s case, then a
low signal from the funding contract could cause the court to not find
for the plaintiff (again, if p is not too high).  Of course, if the court’s
signal was very high, then a low signal from the funder would be much
less likely to cause the court to rule against the plaintiff.90
89. Of course, the funder would like to charge everyone as high an interest rate as possible,
but the higher the rate the funder charges, the less likely the plaintiff will accept the funding
contract.  How far the funder is willing to lower its rate to make sure it makes the loan will
depend on how risky the loan is.  If the loan is less risky, the funder will be more willing to offer
a lower interest rate in order to ensure it can make the loan.
90. The actual evaluation done by the court will be more complicated than this paragraph
makes it seem, but courts are able to manage difficult data points in litigation. See, e.g., Peter P.
Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73
TEX. L. REV. 787, 830–31 (1995).  In one example of a court displaying acuity in dealing with
interest rates, several plaintiffs brought suit alleging discriminatory mortgage lending practices,
which manifested in discriminatory lending terms and conditions toward African-American bor-
rowers.  Edwards v. Flagstar Bank, 109 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (E.D. Mich. 2000).  Discussing the
complexity of evidence presented at trial, the court reflected: “Plaintiffs introduced scores of
documents into evidence, including plaintiffs’ application files with Flagstar, other customer files
of mortgage loans with Flagstar, correspondence and guidelines, underwriting standards, testing
data and data provided to the government by Flagstar under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA), commonly known as HMDA data.” Id. at 694 (citation omitted).  More specifically,
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The additional information provided by the funding contract will be
most important when the plaintiff’s case provides the court with a
marginal signal (where what is marginal will depend on p).  Even a
small shift in favor of the plaintiff will cause the plaintiff to win if the
court is close to having 50% confidence in favor of the plaintiff.  In
such a case, a high signal would give the plaintiff the extra boost that
she needs to prevail in court.  On the other hand, if the court’s signal
gives it just barely over 50% confidence that the plaintiff should pre-
vail, then a low signal from the funder could cause the plaintiff to lose.
As a general matter, the main direct benefit from a funding con-
tract, even before the question of admitting it into court arises, is that
it shifts money from a less liquidity-constrained (or less risk-averse)
party to a more liquidity-constrained (or more risk-averse) party.  The
transfer has welfare enhancing effects because the plaintiff seeking the
loans values the money she will receive now more than the funder
values the money it will receive later (if it receives it at all).  The
model accounts for this valuations differential by providing only the
plaintiff with a positive discount rate, which discounts the future value
of the money due to his or her present need for money to pay bills.
However, even with a positive discount rate, there are still plaintiffs
that will reject a loan from a litigation funder if the interest rate is too
high.
But what are the benefits of allowing the contract to be admitted in
court?  The potential benefits are two-fold.  First, and most obviously,
the inclusion of a second signal should make the court’s decision more
accurate.  As with any evaluation, we assume there is some margin of
error, meaning that the court might incorrectly evaluate a case as be-
ing slightly more likely to be weak than strong even though it is actu-
ally a strong case. For example, one could easily imagine the court’s
own signal leading it to think the chances that the plaintiff is legally
entitled to recover is only 45% even though the plaintiff is, objectively
if all the facts were known, legally entitled to recover.  In fact, this
should happen 45% of the time.  In such cases, the funder’s signal
should usually be high (because, remember, the funder is right more
often than it is wrong), and this will assist the court in making the
correct determination.  Of course, the funder does not know what the
court’s signal will be at the time it makes the loan; thus, the interest
the court commented that the statistical analysis demonstrated divergent rates of rejections be-
tween white and African-American borrowers. Id. at 700.  (“[The expert] expressed the opinion
that there was a significant difference in rate of denial for white applicants and African-Ameri-
can applicants in favor of white applicants.”).
252 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:233
rate it charges will reflect only its own evaluation of the strength of
the plaintiff’s case.
Second, and more importantly in the bigger scheme of third-party
funding, is that the plaintiff with a strong case will get a lower interest
rate because the funder will want to send a strong signal to the court
via its funding contract when it believes the plaintiff has a strong case.
Why does the funder have to lower its interest rate relative to its
profit-maximizing level if the funding contract were not admissible?
The reason is that lower rates are now more profitable because they
will increase the funder’s chance of recovery.  The problem is that it is
now more profitable for everyone—funders who received a high sig-
nal as well as funders who received a low signal. As a result, a funder
who received a high signal, and would have previously charged a
higher rate, has an incentive to lower its interest rate to try to con-
vince the court that it really did receive a high signal.  In other words,
the funder who received a high signal will lower its interest rate to
distinguish itself from a funder who received a low signal and is just
trying to fool the court into believing it received a high one.  To avoid
being fooled, then, the court will require an even lower rate to believe
that the funder really did receive a high signal.  The rate has to be low
enough that a funder with a low signal would not want to offer the
plaintiff this interest rate even if doing so would fool the court be-
cause overall it will not be profitable for it to do so.  As a result, in
order to fully distinguish its signal, the funder who received the high
signal has to charge an even lower interest rate than it would have
charged had the contract not been admissible in court.
Observe that the funder with the high signal is willing to reduce its
rate to a lower level than a funder with a low signal because it is more
likely to be paid back than a funder with a low signal.  Even if a
funder who receives a low signal convinces the court that it actually
received a high signal, this does not change the true strength of the
plaintiff’s case.  The funder with a true low signal knows (when it pro-
vides the loan) that the court is more likely to receive a lower signal
than it would be if the funder’s true signal were high; this will cause
the plaintiff to lose more often even if the court was misled to believe
the funder’s signal was high.  So, even after fooling the court, the
funding contract is still riskier for the funder with the low signal than
it is for a funder with a high signal.  This means the funder with the
low signal will not be willing to reduce its interest rate as low as it
would if it actually received a high signal.
This need to lower interest rates to distinguish a truly high signal
from a low signal that might otherwise pretend to be high suppresses
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the monopoly power that the funder currently has in setting interest
rates.  The funder who receives a high signal about the strength of the
plaintiff’s case cannot charge the otherwise profit-maximizing interest
rate, because the court would then interpret this as a low signal of the
strength of the plaintiff’s case.  We show in our formal model that this
reduction in the probability that the plaintiff would win will cost the
funder more than the benefit it would obtain from charging a higher
interest rate.  Thus, introducing the funding contract into evidence ef-
fectively increases the probability that the plaintiff with a strong case
will prevail while at the same time decreasing the interest rate that she
must pay.  Because the loans are nonrecourse, the funder can only
profit if the plaintiff wins.  When the funding contract is admissible,
the probability is larger when the funder charges a lower interest rate.
This incentivizes the funder to lower its interest rates for plaintiffs
with strong cases.
In sum, the signaling model explicitly considers that the funder may
try to trick the court by giving an artificially low interest rate such that
it sends the signal that the case is strong when, in actuality, the
funder’s signal is of low strength.  Because the court is aware of this
fact, it will believe the funder really thinks the case is strong only if the
interest rate is low enough that a funder who thinks the case is low
strength would not find it profitable to lower the interest rate to this
level even if doing so would convince the court the funder thought the
case was strong.
External constraints facilitate the court in making the correct infer-
ence.  First and most obvious, we must remember that the funder is
trying to make money by investing its capital.  If, for example, it can
get a risk-free return of 3%, then it will never give an interest rate
lower than that rate to any plaintiff, no matter how strong the case,
because there is always some risk that the judge will incorrectly evalu-
ate the case and therefore cause the funder to lose its investment.
Second, as we explained above, riskier cases must be charged higher
interest rates to account for their higher risk of total loss because the
court uses its own signal, as well as the implied signal from the interest
rate on the loan.  If the funder tried to charge too low a rate to trick
the court when the plaintiff’s case was weak, the likelihood that the
court’s signal would be high enough to find for the plaintiff would be
too low to make this profitable.  In fact, it is precisely this condition
that determines by how much a funder who receives a high signal
must lower its interest rate for the court to believe the funder actually
received a high signal.  It has to lower it just enough that no funder
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with a low signal would want to charge such a low rate, even though
doing so would increase its probability of prevailing.
Lastly, our model recognizes that the court will be aware of the
funder’s incentives to mislead it and will weight its evaluation accord-
ingly.  The model finds the conditions for the existence of an equilib-
rium—where the court knows the true strength of the case in the eye
of the funder based on the interest rate the funder charges because it
will never be profitable for the funder to charge this interest rate if the
case is, in fact, weaker.
IV. POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH THE MODEL
Although the model has shown that admitting the contract into evi-
dence is helpful in both lowering interest rates and improving courts’
decision-making accuracy, we note that there are several concerns re-
lated to the model’s workings and the plaintiff’s ability to get the
funding contract before the court.
A. The Court and the Financier Should Come
to the Same Determination
One can argue that the funder and the court should arrive at the
same decision concerning the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  If they
come to different decisions, one might question whether the system is
working because one has clearly made an incorrect determination of
the merits of the plaintiff’s case.  Should the funder and the court
come to the same determination, then one question logically follows:
How does looking at both the funder’s signal and the court’s determi-
nation provide any benefit?  If we assume that the two evaluations
will always be the same, then it would seem that nothing is gained.
The most basic response to this concern is that the funder and the
court will not necessarily come to the same conclusion.  There are sev-
eral reasons to believe not only that they will come to different deci-
sions, but further, that the funder’s decision will be the more accurate
one.  One reason is that the funder may have access to information
not available to the court, such as hearsay evidence.  This would give
the funder a knowledge advantage.  Of course, the funder will only
consider this evidence to the extent it indicates the plaintiff is more
likely to prevail in court, because this is ultimately what the funder
cares about.  This may be the case for two reasons.  First, there are
various exceptions to hearsay exclusions.  Thus, the funder may be-
lieve there is some chance the hearsay evidence will be admissible,
even if it ultimately is not. Second, hearsay evidence that tends to
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prove the plaintiff has a strong case is likely to be positively correlated
with the plaintiff’s ability to produce other evidence that strengthens
its case.  Accordingly, a funder should give positive weight to such
evidence even if the funder believes this evidence itself will likely be
inadmissible.
In addition, the funder may have more incentives to make the right
decision, especially in the commercial litigation funding context where
it will invest millions of dollars.  It is often said that a trial judge wants
to make the right decision to avoid being overturned on appeal, but
the prospect of losing a multimillion dollar investment (in the com-
mercial context) is likely a stronger motivator.  Lastly, more decision
makers are better than one whenever each decision maker is imper-
fect.91  The funder’s signal reflects a different view of the available
evidence by a highly motivated observer.  Consideration of this view
can only increase the accuracy of court decisions.  Furthermore, this
benefit should exceed the benefit of having multi-judge panels be-
cause the funder’s view is completely independent and not subject to
groupthink biases.92
B. Is the Funder Predicting the Case or Predicting the Court?
Another related concern with the model is that the funder will be
predicting the court, and not predicting the case.  In other words, the
funder will give a low interest rate only to cases that are likely to be
found strong by the court.  This makes sense from a business perspec-
tive, because under our model the court must conclude that the plain-
tiff has a strong case for the funder to recover its investment.  But this
means that the funder’s determination of the strength of the case
might not be independent.  If the funder is simply trying to predict
what the court will do, then one may argue that the funder is reinforc-
ing the court’s decision in a circular fashion instead of guiding the
court to a more accurate decision.
This concern reflects a potential misunderstanding of how the
model works.  If we assume that the court is not biased against either
91. There is both theoretical and empirical support for this in many contexts. See, e.g., Max
Wolf et al., Accurate Decisions in an Uncertain World: Collective Cognition Increases True Posi-
tives While Decreasing False Positives, 280 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2777 (2013).
92. Of course if it is a jury, rather than a judge, making the decision for the court, then this last
argument is less forceful because the total number of decision makers will increase less dramati-
cally.  If we count the funder as one entity, then adding the funder’s evaluation to the judge’s
evaluation gives us double the number of evaluations of the case.  With a jury, the number of
people who will evaluate the case only increases from, say, twelve (the jury) to thirteen (the jury
plus the funding entity).  Still, the incentives of the funder to get it right might be stronger than
those of all the jurors combined.
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the plaintiff or the defendant, then the court will try to make the cor-
rect determination.  This means that the best way for the funder to
predict the court is to predict the right decision based on the evidence.
When viewed this way, the reasoning is no longer circular, but rather
reinforcing.  Because everyone, even judges and juries, can make mis-
takes, the funder’s decision may be beneficial to the court in assisting
with correctly evaluating the case.
In addition, given that most cases settle, the funder’s signal can be
very helpful in facilitating accurate settlements.  If the defendant
knows that the funder’s contract will be admissible evidence in court,
then the defendant will also use the interest rate in the contract as an
indication of how the court might decide the case.  This will reduce the
potential for disagreements about the likely outcome and provide the
plaintiff a way to credibly reveal the strength of its case.  Just as the
interest rate can provide valuable and credible information to the
court, it can also provide this information to defendants in the context
of settlement negotiations.  In fact, this information will be even more
valuable in settlement negotiations than at trial because the defendant
may not have as accurate of a signal as the court will have about the
strength of the plaintiff’s case.  By reducing the asymmetry of infor-
mation between the parties, making the contract admissible in court
will both facilitate settlement in general and at a level that more accu-
rately reflects the true strength of the plaintiff’s case.
C. Can the Funding Contract Be Admitted in Court?
One final concern with the model, and the one most likely to delay
its implementation, is that the model does not conform to the prem-
ises of the American legal system.  Our system is not based on the
court being a Bayesian fact finder that updates its prior evaluation
based on evidence.  More, our system definitely does not take into
account third parties’ beliefs about the strength of the case.  Nor is
there empirical evidence to suggest that our legal system is best de-
scribed, or modeled, as such.  One operational upshot from this mis-
match between our model and the way our legal system operates is
that it is hard to see how these funding contracts, which contain the
interest rate, could be submitted to the court, even if one is willing to
take the conceptual leap required to bridge between the current
American legal system and our model.  Because these contracts have
not historically been admitted to the court, there is no precedent on
how it could be done.  In order for the funding contract to be reliably
admitted into court, lawmakers will likely have to enact a specific law,
and Congress is unlikely to do this any time soon.
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Therefore, we engage below in a thought experiment and offer two
possible ways that these contracts might be admitted to the court as-
suming no change in the law.  These methods are meant to suggest
how the funding contract could possibly fit within the current eviden-
tiary system.
Before getting into the details, we would like to make two notes.
First, there is some evidence from other common law legal systems
that courts are willing to makes some inference about the strength of
the case from the existence of a reputable third-party litigation funder.
In one case, the funder was the Israeli agency which regulates securi-
ties, the equivalent to the American SEC.93  Second, and closer to
home, it is worth mentioning that courts have long been influenced by
factors that are not technically admissible in court.  For example, it is
often stated that judges consider an attorney’s reputation when evalu-
ating his or her legal argument.94  Although this should not make a
difference to the judge, the evidence shows that it does.  Allowing
third-party funding may allow a plaintiff to obtain better counsel be-
cause a financed plaintiff can offer a better deal to attract a good law-
yer, unlike a plaintiff who gets no financing.  Further, admitting the
contract in court allows the plaintiff to send a strong signal to the
court without having to offer a sweeter deal to his or her lawyer.
Given that evidence rules vary by state, our brief look at the admis-
sibility of the third-party funding interest rates will focus on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.  As a general matter, Rules 401 and 402
require that evidence admissible in court be relevant.  Relevance is
defined in Rule 401 as evidence that has “any tendency to make a fact
93. According to the Israel class action law from 2006, a plaintiff in a securities class action
can ask the Israeli equivalent to the SEC to fund her lawsuit.  The agency may fund the suit if it
is convinced that there is public interest in the suit and that there is a reasonable chance that the
court will approve the suit as a class action.  In Success—The Consumer Movement for Advanc-
ing a Fair Econ. Soc’y v. Cohen the court said:
on its face, there is some weight to the agency’s decision to help fund the lawsuit.
When such a decision is given by the agency, which is an objective and informed body,
it means the lawsuit is not meritless.  The decision of the agency supports the thesis the
plaintiff advances and on its face suggests it is a worthy suit.  It is worth mentioning that
until now the agency exercised its discretion very carefully.  From 2002 to today it
helped fund 18 class actions and 2 derivative actions.  This data suggests meticulousness
and carefulness on the side of the agency and show that it does not rush into funding
suits which it believes have no merits.
File No. 2484-09-12 District Court (TA), Success—The Consumer Movement for Advancing a
Fair Econ. Soc’y v. Cohen (Feb. 18, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (author
translation).
94. See Stephen D. Easton, My Last Lecture: Unsolicited Advice for Future and Current Law-
yers, 56 S.C. L. REV. 229, 248 (2004) (“A lawyer’s single most important asset is his or her
reputation.  If judges and jurors trust you, they will believe your arguments and will be more
likely to find in your favor.” (footnote omitted)).
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more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and
requires that “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”95
Rule 402 then provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless the
Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.96
1. Expert Testimony or Written Exhibit
Expert testimony and expert reports are governed by Article VII of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which covers opinions and expert testi-
mony.  Rule 702 allows testimony by witnesses that the court has
deemed qualified as experts if, among other things, the testimony is
based on sufficient facts or data and the expert’s specialized knowl-
edge will help the trier of fact understand the case.97  An expert’s tes-
timony is even allowed to embrace the ultimate issue of the case98 and
can be based upon facts or data that the expert is personally aware of,
regardless of whether that information would otherwise be admissible
in court.99  The information that forms the basis of the report—here
the interest rate—is admissible, even if it were otherwise inadmissible,
if its “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the [expert’s] opin-
ion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect.”100  The court will
make this determination, but because the funder has a financial incen-
tive to make the interest rate reflect the strength of the case, one
could argue that there will be minimal prejudicial effects; any such
effects will be substantially outweighed by the benefit the interest rate
provides to the jury or judge in correctly deciding the case.
95. FED. R. EVID. 401.
96. FED. R. EVID. 402.  It should also be noted that while Federal Rule of Evidence 408 bars
the admission of compromise offers and negotiations, see FED. R. EVID. 408, the reasoning be-
hind the rule does not apply to funding contracts.  Rule 408 is meant to encourage compromise
and settlement between the plaintiff and the defendant, a rationale not applicable to a contract
between the plaintiff and a third party.  The agreement between the plaintiff and the funder is
not a settlement of the claim, but rather a loan contingent on the outcome of the case.
97. FED. R. EVID. 702.
98. FED. R. EVID. 704.  In most jurisdictions this is true of factual conclusions, but legal con-
clusions by experts may be barred by the judge.  For example, in United States v. Zipkin, the
Sixth Circuit ruled that a bankruptcy judge’s expert testimony on the requirements of the law
was impermissible.  United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 386–87 (6th Cir. 1984).  During his
testimony, the bankruptcy judge answered questions about the ability of a receiver to receive
interim fees under the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 386.  In disqualifying the expert testimony, the
court commented: “It is the function of the trial judge to determine the law of the case.  It is
impermissible to delegate that function to a jury through the submission of testimony on control-
ling legal principles.” Id. at 387.
99. FED. R. EVID. 703.
100. Id.
2014] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 259
Expert testimony from a third-party lender on the interest rate
would most likely be a conclusion on a mixed issue of law and fact,
meaning it would admissible in some, but not all, jurisdictions.101
While there are concerns about expert testimony on the ultimate issue
of the case, “[i]n a majority of state courts, an expert may now state
his opinion on an ultimate fact.”102  Rule 704 similarly provides that
testimony in the form of “an opinion is not objectionable just because
it embraces an ultimate issue” to be decided by the trier of fact.103
Despite these broad statements, it is also true that testimony on the
ultimate issue may still be rejected.  For example, Rules 701 and 702
require that a witness’s testimony be helpful, and a statement that the
plaintiff should prevail is simply not useful.104  Assuming the testi-
mony would be allowed, the lender would testify about his analysis of
the factual arguments in the case, how the law applies to those facts,
and the resulting evaluation of the strength of the plaintiff’s case, as
expressed through the interest rate.  Provided that the third-party
lender has some expertise in analyzing the particular type of legal
claim at issue in the case, the testimony is similar to expert testimony
by accountants or doctors admitted in other cases.105  The best way to
101. Expert testimony on mixed question of law and facts is treated differently across jurisdic-
tions.  Such testimony is expressly admissible in the Second Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Texas, and
Maine. See, e.g., Fiataruolo v. United States, 8 F.3d 930, 941 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Experts may testify
on questions of fact as well as mixed questions of fact and law.”); Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d
657, 673 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that an attorney could testify on a question of mixed law and
fact, but not on purely legal matters); Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365
(Tex. 1987) (“Fairness and efficiency dictate that an expert may state an opinion on a mixed
question of law and fact as long as the opinion is confined to the relevant issues and is based on
proper legal concepts.”); Castine Energy Constr., Inc. v. T.T. Dunphy, Inc., 861 A.2d 671, 677
(Me. 2004) (finding it “permissible for an expert to testify regarding factual issues that also
concern legal standards”).  However many other jurisdictions have expressly rejected expert tes-
timony on mixed questions of law and fact, including Iowa, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
and New Hampshire. See, e.g., Grismore v. Consol. Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646, 663 (Iowa 1942)
(holding that expert testimony on mixed questions of law and fact is not admissible); Lawhorne
v. Soltis, 384 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Ga. 1989) (holding that expert testimony is inadmissible if “the
inference drawn is a mixture of law and fact”); Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 775 N.E.2d 770, 781
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (“Lay and expert witnesses are precluded from giving an opinion, for the
most part, that involves a conclusion of law or in regard to a mixed question of fact and law.”);
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (“[O]pinions involving a legal analysis or
mixed questions of law and fact are deemed to be of no use to the jury.”); Johnston ex rel.
Johnston v. Lynch, 574 A.2d 934, 939–40 (N.H. 1990).
102. 1 KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12, at 61 (6th ed. 2006).
103. FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
104. 1 BROWN ET AL., supra note 102, § 12, at 61 n.12.
105. Cf., e.g., Fiataruolo, 8 F.3d at 941 (upholding the trial court’s admission of expert testi-
mony from a certified public accountant for a mixed question of law and fact in a tax refund
case); Isern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 193–94 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding the trial court’s
admission of expert testimony from doctors on a mixed question of law and fact in a medical
malpractice case).
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establish the required expertise would be to call to the witness stand a
lender with a background in the subject matter of the case, but it may
also be established by showing that the lender has experience analyz-
ing similar legal claims.
Aside from simply using expert testimony, a party may also use an
expert to introduce the funding contract as a written exhibit.  The con-
tract alone would likely not be useful to the jury without an explana-
tion of the methodology and meaning behind the interest rate.  For
that reason, it would be best to introduce it along with expert testi-
mony as to its meaning.  To be admissible as a written exhibit, the
funding contract must meet the basic foundations of admissibility: rel-
evance, authenticity, and nonhearsay.  As previously discussed, the
funding contract is relevant to the jury’s decision because it provides
additional information that can help inform the jury’s decision.106  To
satisfy authenticity, assuming that the expert on the stand was one of
the parties to the funding contract, the expert could testify to the au-
thenticity of the contract, which would probably satisfy that require-
ment under Rule 901.  One could also imagine an economics expert
testifying as to why the interest rate in the contract provides relevant
and unbiased information about the strength of the plaintiff’s case.
There are, of course, a number of issues with using expert testimony
to admit the funding contract.  In most jurisdictions, an expert wit-
ness’s compensation cannot be contingent on the outcome of the
case.107  One could argue that because the witness works for the fund-
ing company, and the funding company will only recover its invest-
ment if the plaintiff is successful, then the witness is essentially being
compensated upon a victory for the plaintiff, which would violate this
rule.  On the other hand, it could also be argued that the witness her-
self is not receiving any compensation for her testimony, and thus this
rule is not violated.  This side of the argument is stronger if the wit-
ness is a salaried employee (rather than, for example, the owner) of
the funding company.  If the bias were not such that it automatically
barred the witness from testifying, the witness’s potential financial
bias is still something that could be used to impeach her on cross-
examination.108
106. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
107. Crowe v. Bolduc, 334 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The majority rule in this country is
that an expert witness may not collect compensation which by agreement was contingent on the
outcome of a controversy. That rule was adopted precisely to avoid even potential bias.”).
108. 1 KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 39 (7th ed. 2013); see also 4
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 607:7 (7th ed. 2012) (collecting
cases on bias stemming from a financial interest in a civil suit).
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Next, we address the hearsay rule, which bars admission of any
statement that was (1) not made while testifying at the current trial,
and (2) offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the state-
ment, unless an exclusion or exception applies.109  Even though the
funding contract would be considered a statement that was not made
while testifying at the trial—sometimes referred to as an out of court
statement—it could potentially still be admitted.  One option is to ar-
gue that the funding contract falls within the business records excep-
tion in Rule 803(6).  Under the business records exception, the
“records of a regularly conducted activity” are admissible as a hearsay
exception if they meet certain criteria.110  The idea behind the busi-
ness records exception is that self-reliance provides a signal that the
evidence is credible,111 and this concept applies to the third-party
funding contract and weighs in favor of its admissibility.  It is also pos-
sible that economic expert testimony might be required to support the
business record.  But if so, this would create other issues because such
testimony would arguably overtake the judge or jury’s role in evaluat-
ing the case and therefore exceed the permissible scope of witness
testimony.112
Finally, one may be concerned about the attorney-client work-prod-
uct doctrine and its applicability to the funding contract’s admissibil-
ity.  It is possible that the funder’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s case
may be covered under the work-product extension to the attorney-
client privilege.113  If it is covered, this means that the funding contract
109. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
110. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).  To satisfy these criteria the plaintiff would need to satisfy the
following requirements:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted
by—someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another quali-
fied witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a
statute permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
111. 1 BROWN ET AL., supra note 102, § 286.
112. For a discussion of economic expert witnesses, see generally Richard A. Posner, The Law
and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, J. ECON. PERSP. Spring 1999, at 91.
113. See 1 BROWN ET AL., supra note 102, § 96.  On the one hand, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) states that the document sought to be protected under the work-product
doctrine must have been “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.” Id. (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)).  Although the funding contract was prepared in relation to litigation, it is
not clear that it was prepared for trial in this sense and therefore may not be covered.  On the
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could be privileged and therefore not admissible in court without the
plaintiff’s consent.  However, given that the introduction of the fund-
ing contract is shown to help the plaintiff, especially if the interest rate
demonstrates a strong case, the plaintiff would probably agree to
waive the attorney-client privilege so the funding contract can be in-
troduced.114  This could be done by a clause within the funding con-
tract, or by an evidentiary law that required mandatory waiver under
certain circumstances.
2. Amicus Curiae
Amicus curiae is a Latin phrase that means “friend of the court,” as
distinguished from an advocate before the court.115  Given that an
amicus’s purpose is to help the court make its decision, it is within the
sole discretion of the court to decide whether an amicus can partici-
pate in the litigation.116  While most appellate courts have specific
rules that govern amicus briefs,117 there is no rule in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or most state rules of procedure on the topic.  Trial
courts have declared that there is no inherent right to file an amicus
brief, and that the decision is left to the discretion of the judge.118
While the original idea of an amicus was solely as a friend of the court,
it is now accepted that an amicus may play an adversarial role in the
litigation.119  Judge Richard Posner has stated that leave to file an ami-
cus brief should be granted “when the amicus has unique information
or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the law-
yers for the parties are able to provide.”120
Based on the court’s inherent power, it may be possible for a third-
party funder to submit the funding contract with the interest rate to
the court as part of an amicus brief.  Following Judge Posner’s logic,
since the amicus brief will provide the court with information the
court is otherwise unable to obtain, leave to file the brief should be
granted.  Therefore, the amicus brief may provide another way to
other hand, the judge is “directed to ‘protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B)).  The third-party
funder does seem to fit within this part of the rule, which has been referred to as “opinion” work
product (as opposed to fact work product). Id. § 96, at 439 n.33 (citing Comment, The Potential
for Discovery of Opinion Work Product Under Rule 26(b)(3), 64 IOWA L. REV. 103 (1978)).
114. See supra Part III.
115. See Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir. 1953).
116. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903).
117. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29; N.Y. RULES OF COURT § 500.23 (McKinney 2010).
118. E.g., Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1178 (D. Nev. 1999).
119. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
120. Id.
2014] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 263
have the interest rate admitted into the record for the judge to
evaluate.
However, courts have been wary of attempts to use amicus briefs as
an end run around the standard, and generally more rigorous, meth-
ods for admitting evidence.  For example, in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
School District, the judge struck from the record an amicus brief that
had been filed on behalf of the defendant.121  The brief was submitted
by Meyer, who was previously retained as an expert by the defendant,
and the brief attached Meyer’s expert report that was prepared while
he was still retained.122  The judge held that submission of an expert
report in this fashion, without the usual procedures of cross-examina-
tion, was inappropriate.123  Specifically, the court would not condone
a “back door” attempt to include expert testimony in the record.124
Applying this logic to the admission of third-party funding con-
tracts, it may be necessary to allow some form of cross-examination to
determine exactly why a certain interest rate was awarded in a given
case.  This might mean that a typical amicus brief is not the best way
to admit the funding contract, as the testimony of the funder might be
needed.  In that case, maybe expert testimony is a better avenue.  On
the other hand, the court has discretion to allow amicus briefs, and
may be acting within its power if it decides to allow the submission of
a brief that includes the interest rate in the funding contract.
V. CONCLUSION
We argued that third-party litigation funding contracts are desira-
ble, and that allowing their admittance in courts has some further di-
rect socially desirable effect such as neutralizing to some extent the
funder’s monopoly power over the borrower, and improving courts’
decision making. There are a few issues, however, that we have left
out of the model.  First, as was mentioned above, a secondary market
for litigation funding has been recently developed.  Should the funder
be allowed to securitize its claim and sell it in a second market?  Such
packaging of legal-claim-backed securities might change the funders’
incentives.  For instance, assuming the funder has control or a veto
power on whether to settle or litigate, it might be more likely to liti-
gate (as he reduces risk through diversification) and perhaps even
more likely to purchase “junk” cases, mistakenly hoping that in a well-
121. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., No. 4:04-cv-02688 (M.D. Penn. Oct. 24, 2005) (order
granting motion to strike amicus briefs).
122. Id. at 1–2.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 4.
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diversified portfolio everything will work well at the end.125  Ulti-
mately, selling the case in the secondary market might dilute the sig-
naling property of the regime.
Second, the third-party litigation funding regime might distort
plaintiffs’ incentives to seek other nonmonetary remedies, such as an
injunction.  Funders will not be interested in funding such cases, and
plaintiffs will lose the signaling benefit of a funder.  As a result, they
will seek more damage awards than before.  That said, plaintiffs with
an immediate need for money, those most likely to seek third-party
litigation funding, are probably those that are least likely to seek in-
junctive remedies in the first place.  Thus, making third-party funding
contracts admissible in court should lower interest rates, reduce the
incidence of frivolous suits, and improve the defendants’ incentives to
take care.
Finally, and most importantly, there is a question regarding the ex-
tent to which third-party funding increases social welfare.  Obviously,
even without admissibility, allowing third-party funding should in-
crease the number of lawsuits because it gives plaintiffs a choice that
may (or ought to) make such lawsuits more attractive.  If the funding
contract were admissible evidence, this would make lawsuits that can
receive relatively low interest rate funding even more attractive.  That
said, if juries were allowed to draw adverse inferences from the non-
introduction of a third-party funding contract, this would make weak
lawsuits even less attractive than before.  Thus, our model implies that
the average quality of the cases filed will increase while the total num-
ber of lawsuits need not increase.  This in turn will incentivize the de-
fendant to take more care, which might eventually lead to fewer
accidents and fewer claims filed, improving social welfare.
125. This is similar to what occurred in the recent housing crisis.
